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In recent years there has been a number of attempts by different researchers 
to study men and masculinity using a combination of discourse theory and 
psychoanalysis.  The main reason for this development is the sense that, on 
its own, discourse theory provides an incomplete account of masculine 
subjectivity.  Psychoanalysis is thought to be able to fill those gaps.  In this 
paper I want to begin by reviewing these arguments.  I will provide an 
outline of the alleged deficiencies in discursive approaches to men and 
masculinity before going on to examine some of the work that has attempted 
the above synthesis.  What I aim to show is that, for a number of reasons, 
such attempts are bound to fail.  Instead, I will argue that better progress can 
be made in studies of masculinity by remaining within the theoretical 
boundaries of Discursive Psychology. 
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In recent years there has been a steady accumulation of work that has taken a 
discursive approach to studying men and masculinity (e.g. Berger et al., 
1995; Edley, 2001; Edley & Wetherell, 1997, 1999; Frosh, 2000; Frosh et al, 
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2002; Gough, 1998, 2004; Johnson and Meinhof, 1997; Redman, 2000; 
Wetherell & Edley, 1999; Willott & Griffin, 1997).  Central to this body of 
work is the claim that masculinity is not something that stands outside of 
discourse as an essential aspect or quality of men; instead, it is seen as 
something that is routinely constructed in and through discourse.  Following 
the pioneering work of Harold Garfinkel (1967), Susan Kessler and Wendy 
McKenna (1978) and Candice West and Don Zimmerman (1987), these 
studies have looked at the discursive accomplishment of masculinity.  More 
specifically, they have analysed both how the meaning of masculinity is 
sustained and renegotiated in discourse and also how masculine identities 
are flexibly constructed and deployed in a variety of different contexts or 
settings. 
 
Despite the significant achievements of these studies there has also been, at 
the same time, a clear concern expressed across the human and social 
sciences about the overall adequacy of such discourse-based approaches.  
Broadly understood, these concerns tend to focus upon two central issues.  
The first consists of the claim that most discourse approaches lack an 
appropriate ontology of the self.  In other words, it is felt that such studies 
contribute little, if anything, to an understanding of what might be somewhat 
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euphemistically described as the mind behind the mouth.  Taking Discursive 
Psychology (henceforth DP) as a case in point, one can easily see the 
grounds for such a complaint, for within that approach, questions regarding 
the nature of the speaking subject are typically suspended or ‘bracketed out’ 
(see Edwards and Potter, 1992; c.f. Berger and Luckmann, 1985).  
Discursive Psychologists, like many other discourse theorists, typically 
adopt an agnostic position with respect to issues of ontology.  What they 
analyse instead are the ways that debates about, for example, ‘the nature of 
men’ are played out in ordinary everyday discourse.  In other words, the 
‘reality’ of men or masculinity is treated, within DP, as both a topic and an 
outcome of ‘participants’’ discourse practices.     
 
Nevertheless, if one thinks about the model of the human subject implied, at 
least, by DP it is hard to deny that it appears somewhat deflated or truncated.  
Some of the things that have been traditionally understood as laying at the 
very heart of people – like attitudes, memories and emotions – have been 
reinterpreted within DP as ‘structures of social action’ (Atkinson & 
Heritage, 1984); that is, as forms of discourse produced inter-actively in 
various contexts or settings.  Indeed, in the work of some Discursive 
Psychologists (e.g. Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998), identity itself is treated 
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as a discursive resource – rather than as the origin point of language.  
Likewise, for many post-structuralist theorists (e.g. Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), 
identities are understood as discursive effects.  They are said to represent 
‘nodes’ within discourse; points or moments of articulation that temporarily 
position people as particular kinds of beings in the world.  All this has led 
some critics to complain that discourse theory has gone too far in its ‘de-
centring’ of the Cartesian subject.  Indeed, in the opinion of some, it has all 
but been pushed off the theoretical map. 
 
[In DP] self is studied only in terms of individual, discursive acts 
which perform various social activities such as presenting a certain 
image of the self, excusing, blaming, and so on.  This results in a 
conception of self in which subjective experience [...] is made so 
context dependent, so fluid and flexible, that there seems to be little 
beyond a personal psychology which is a moment-to-moment situated 
experience.  Language and context are emphasized to such an extent 
that the self is engulfed, if not annihilated (Crossley, 2000, pg. 530). 
 
 
For critics such as Crossley, the model of the human subject afforded by 
approaches such as DP stands at simply too great a distance from its 
phenomenological or experiential reality.  Their point is that, despite the 
claims of discourse theory, in our everyday lives, people do actually feel 
themselves to be something more substantial and enduring.  As Mark 
Freeman (1993) wryly observes: 
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Even if we deconstruct the subject to pieces and argue over the 
duplicity of the self and the multiplicity of the self and the fictionality 
of the self and a thousand other things that the self isn't besides – 
whole, centred, integrated, unified and what have you – don’t most of 
us continue to posit in a rather unabashedly romantic fashion that 
there are some things that are really ‘us’ and other things that are not? 
(pg. 207). 
 
For Freeman, any adequate theory of identity has ‘to do justice to the lives 
we live’ (1993; 13).  It has to be able to account for that sense of depth, 
particularity and continuity across both space and time.  It also has to 
account, he suggests, for what one might call the stickiness of identity – a 
point that brings us on to the second key concern about discourse-based 
approaches. 
 
Amongst discourse theories, DP has been particularly concerned to 
challenge essentialist understandings of identity.  In our masculinities 
research, for example, Margie Wetherell and I have drawn repeated attention 
to the flexibility with which men construct their own, and others’, identities 
(Edley and Wetherell, 1997; 1999; Wetherell and Edley, 1999).  Here, ‘who’ 
or ‘what’ men are appears to be fluid and indeterminate, rather than 
permanent or fixed.  However, this kind of work has led some critics to 
argue that discourse theory peddles an implicit model of the human subject 
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in which speakers seem to be able to make entirely strategic or ‘executive’ 
decisions about which identity to adopt in any given context (see Bowers, 
1988 and Parker, 1997).  For them such a view greatly exaggerates the 
extent of human agency1.  As far as Freeman (1993) is concerned, people are 
all too aware of the limits of identity.  The existence of so many therapists, 
counsellors and self-help books would seem to testify, he would argue, not 
just to the fact that many people feel unhappy with (at least aspects of) 
themselves, but also to the fact that it is no simple matter to change.  In life, 
Freeman says, people feel bound to certain ways of being and yet, the critics 
claim, discourse theory offers little or no insight into the nature of those 
bonds.  
 
Given that discourse theory is seen to lack (i) an appropriate ontology of the 
self and (ii) an adequate account of the ‘fixations’ of identity, it is little 
wonder that a number of researchers interested in studying men and 
masculinity have turned their attentions to psychoanalysis; for across the 
social sciences it remains unparalleled as an account (or series of accounts) 
of the ‘interior’ workings of the human mind.  Psychoanalysis provides us 
with a detailed model of both the structure and the processes of the psyche 
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which, according to the likes of Frosh (1999), help us to explain, not just 
how identities are discursively constructed, but also why. 
 
Surveying the Synthesis 
 
In order to illustrate how discourse theory and psychoanalysis have been 
brought together in the study of men and masculinity, I will be drawing upon 
three bodies of work: Tony Jefferson’s studies of Mike Tyson (Jefferson, 
1996; 1997; 1998), Stephen Frosh and colleagues’ work on ‘young’ 
masculinities (2000, 2002, 2003) and Brendan Gough’s (2004) research on, 
predominantly, male undergraduates.  In all of these instances the authors 
concerned align themselves explicitly with most of the central tenets of 
discourse theory.  All accept, for example, that people see the world through 
discourse and that language mediates one’s experiences of the world.  All 
appear to accept too that discourse makes available various locations or 
‘subject positions’ (Davies and Harré, 1990) for people to occupy.  
However, what particularly unites this group is the belief that discourse 
theory cannot adequately account for the ‘choices’ that men make with 
respect to those discursive possibilities (see, for example, Frosh et al, 2003).  
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To do that, they argue, one needs a psychic as well as a social level of 
explanation. 
 
Although some are more forthcoming than others about the precise details of 
their own theoretical foundations, all of the above authors place a particular 
emphasis upon the notion of anxiety and its everyday management or 
control.  In his collaboration with Wendy Hollway, for example (Hollway 
and Jefferson, 2000), Jefferson draws upon the work of Melanie Klein 
(Klein, 1988a and b).  Following Klein, he suggest that anxiety is intrinsic to 
all human existence, stemming from our earliest experiences of absolute 
dependency – when the infant has no sense of when or even if it is going to 
be looked after and fed.  As a result, Klein argued, from a very tender age 
people come to employ various ego-defence mechanisms – such as splitting, 
projection and repression – which are all designed to protect a person’s ego 
and to shore-up their sense of self-worth.   
 
In the latter part of the 1990s Jefferson explored these ideas in a series of 
papers about the former world heavy-weight champion boxer, Mike Tyson 
(Jefferson, 1996; 1997; 1998).  For Jefferson, Tyson represents a man who is 
firmly identified with what many of us working within the field would call 
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hegemonic masculinity (Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985; see also Wetherell 
and Edley, 1999).  In other words, he was (is) someone who saw himself as 
a hard man: tough, uncompromising and fiercely competitive.  Of course, 
central to the concept of hegemonic masculinity is the notion that this is a 
celebrated or, in some way, privileged form of masculine identity – and, 
indeed, Tyson could well stand as a paradigmatic example of how, as an 
instantiation of that identity, he was able to court both enormous fame and 
fortune.  Yet, for Jefferson, it is a mistake to see Tyson as a simple player or 
performer of macho masculinity.  Rather, he suggests that there is something 
compulsive about this identity for Tyson.  The boxer is presented as someone 
bound to a subject position that both makes and, subsequently, breaks him2. 
 
Jefferson substantiates this argument – in the time-honoured fashion of 
psychoanalysis – by tracing a line back through Tyson’s early development.  
There he notes how, as a child, Tyson was constantly teased and bullied by 
his peers.  Indeed, almost unbelievably, his nickname at one time was ‘little 
fairy boy’ – in respect of the fact that he was seen as both socially retiring 
and spoke with a conspicuous lisp.  The story goes however that one day, in 
a transforming moment, the young Tyson effectively struck back at his 
tormentors.  From that point onwards, it is claimed, Tyson became the 
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prosecutor, rather than the victim, of oppressive behaviour.  Jefferson notes 
that in his life as an up-and-coming boxer (following a visit to his 
neighbourhood by Mohammed Ali), one thing that apparently stood out 
about Tyson was his ‘burning intensity’.  Echoing the more recent stories 
about the English rugby union star, Jonny Wilkinson, Tyson was said to 
practice long after all his contemporaries had packed up and gone home.  
For Jefferson, fighting appeared to have provided Tyson with the means of 
defending, not just his physical self, but also his fragile ego.  It became his 
way of proving himself, both to himself, as well as to the world at large. 
 
To some degree, of course, it could be argued that Tyson’s case history 
represents just a more extreme example of a much more general set of 
psychodynamic processes found within every man and boy.  As a number of 
different theorists have suggested (e.g. Chodorow, 1989; Frosh, 1993; 
Greenson, 1968; Seidler, 1989), there appears to be something inherently 
defensive about the nature of masculinity.  ‘Proving’ one’s manhood seems 
to involve a continual ‘flight’ from the feminine.  In psychoanalytic terms, it 
involves the active repudiation of an original identification (with the mother) 
which, for most men, is never completely broken.  As such, it acts as a font 
of conflict, ambiguity and anxiety.  From a psychoanalytic point of view, 
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this would go some way to explaining the well documented fact that, in 
Britain at least, school playgrounds and classrooms are rife with 
homophobic discourse (where words like ‘poof’ and ‘queer’ are routinely 
used as insults or ‘put-downs’ – see Frosh, Phoenix and Pattman, 2002) for, 
according to its theories, such behaviour represents a fairly typical outcome 
of ‘dangerous’ thoughts and desires being split off from oneself and 
projected onto others3. 
 
Due to the remoteness of his principal subject, Jefferson inevitably relies, in 
these studies, upon evidence gleaned from secondary texts about Mike 
Tyson (e.g. from published biographies).  Very little, in terms of his data, 
comes straight from the boxer’s mouth.  By contrast, in both Stephen Frosh 
and Brendan Gough’s research, the analysis of ‘defensive’ masculinities 
takes place using the transcripts of semi-structured interviews which are, in 
part at least, reproduced for the readers’ benefit.  As such, it is here that we 
can gain the clearest sense of how the melding of discursive and 
psychoanalytic approaches is managed empirically.     
 
As at least partial advocates of discourse theory, these two authors subject 
their data to a form of rhetorical analysis, whereby the texts are monitored 
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for their various ‘action-orientations’.   However, at the same time, both 
insist that there is a remainder; that this level of analysis does not exhaust all 
that patterns the text.  Their participants’ talk is also marked, they claim, by 
the traces of ego-defences.  Gough (2004), for instance, talks of being drawn 
to moments in a transcript where speakers appear either say too much or too 
little.  Reference is made to instances of ‘unsolicited’ themes (pg. 256) and 
to utterances that seemed unduly ‘colourful’ (pg. 254) or impassioned.  Like 
recent talk about suicide bombers, single mothers or asylum seekers, there 
appears to be something else going on underneath the level of local 
pragmatics.  Consider, for example, the following data extract (reproduced 
in full from Gough, 2004):   
Extract One 
Joe I know (.) like (.) a few gay lads that work at the club and when 
they see me they come up to me and give me a kiss on the cheek= 
Trev =oh no! (.) uhhh I just couldn’t (.) its just not= 
Joe =I call you love and flower but you dont get offended do you 
Trev yeah (.) I mean (.) 
Joe but what if I turned around and said I was gay (.) would you 
 instantly dislike me because of it 
Trev no (.) I mean I’ve got (.) I have got one gay friend and (...) I’m 
 not bothered (.) as long as they don’t come on to me 
Joe so what makes you think that any homosexual’s gonna come on to 
you 
Trev well (.) I’m not bothered if they come on to me (.) as long as they 
don’t! {both laugh} no (.) 
Joe is it that it would repulse you to give a guy a kiss 
Trev oh yeah (.) big time (.) yeah= 
Joe =but why 
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Trev it’s just disgustin (.) I can’t stand it (.) I just don’t think its right 
Joe what about a couple of girls snoggin? 
Trev no it’s not= 
Joe =if they were attractive 
Trev if they were attractive (.) if they were attractive it {both laugh} no (.) 
it has a sexual tone yeah (.) but= 
Joe =what if it was two attractive blokes 
Trev there’s no such thing (.) is there 
Joe two of the guys from Levi ads with six packs and (.) all 
 muscly and that 
Trev I just don’t understand it I don’t know (.) I can’t help it (.) not that 
I’m (bothered) anyway (.) I just can’t stand it (.) it’s just not on 
 
 
In his analysis of this extract, Gough remarks on how ‘Trev’s’ presentation 
of himself as liberal and rational is ruptured by moments of ‘uncensored’ 
‘horror and disgust’ (pg. 256).  Trevor might say that he’s ‘not bothered’ by 
homosexuality but it is clear, Gough argues, that he is.  For Gough, the 
extract neatly documents Trevor’s struggle – and ultimate failure – to 
contain deep-seated anxieties about his own gender and sexual identity.  A 
similar kind of conclusion is drawn by Frosh, Phoenix and Pattman (2002) 
in their studies of ‘young masculinities’.  For example, in the following 
stretch of talk, a group of year 8 schoolboys are talking about the idea of 
appreciating other boys’ good looks.  
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 Extract Two 
Geoff 'Cos if a boy goes, 'You look really good looking' you gonna kinda 
run off but like 
Sam Yeah, I'd knock 'em, I'd give 'em one 
Arnie What are you some kind of a sicko or something [several laughing] 
Dan There's no way you telling me I'm good looking 
Geoff Yeah, he probably goes 'you're very nice looking'. [several 
laughing] 
Sam You gay or something boy? 
 
Once again we see the same kind of sentiments expressed.  Like Trevor in 
Extract One, the boys seem to find it difficult to imagine finding another 
male attractive.  Many, the authors claim, found the very idea pretty strange.  
Most were said to be uncomfortable even contemplating it.  Here, as 
elsewhere in their data, the boys talk about homosexuality within the tropes 
of fear and loathing.  The gay man is portrayed as both dangerous and 
despicable.  What this illustrates, the authors conclude, is the ‘ubiquity and 
intensity of fears about being thought of as gay’ (pg. 189).  These themes do 
not emerge because, in some way, they fit the demands of that particular 
rhetorical setting.  Rather, it is claimed, they appear in discourse both as a 
reflection and as a working-through of tensions that mark the psyche of most 
men and boys. 
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Scrutinizing the Synthesis 
 
As is clear from the title of this paper, the broader aim of reviewing the 
attempted synthesis of discourse theory and psychoanalysis is not to arrive at 
its recommendation.  Indeed, quite the reverse, it is to argue for its 
impossibility.  However, it is important to make clear at this point that, in a 
sense, my objections are not to do with psychoanalysis (nor indeed discourse 
theory) per se – rather, they concern the viability of combining the two 
approaches. 
 
At the heart of those misgivings is the point that, whilst the two paradigms 
share an obvious interest in analysing language, they theorise discourse in 
profoundly different ways.  As is now well recognised, discourse analysts 
take language as their central topic or focus of interest.  In other words, they 
look at language directly, in order to work out its functions or action 
orientations.  In contrast, psychoanalysts take a much more traditional line or 
position.  They are not so much interested in language per se, but in what it 
can tell us about the speaker’s underlying state of mind.  What this means, of 
course, is that, to some extent at least, psychoanalysis is predicated on the 
very model of language that discourse theory has served to destabilize. 
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 If we look at Gough’s (2004) analysis, for instance, we can see that he 
frequently treats language as if it was a transparent or ‘do-nothing domain’ 
(Edwards, 1997).  When Trev says he’s ‘disgusted’ by the thought of kissing 
another man, Gough treats this as simple statement of fact.  When Trev says 
he ‘can’t stand’ homosexuals, again Gough takes this claim at face value.  
Of course, when Trevor claims he’s ‘not bothered’ by homosexuality, 
Gough asserts that, in reality, he is bothered – but this act of interpretation is 
still located within the same model of language in which discourse maps 
(either well or ill) on to some other realm or domain. 
 
Gough’s analysis also treads on the toes of discourse theory insofar as it 
implies that the analyst is in a (privileged) position to arbitrate over the 
nature of the Real.  Clearly, in order to gloss an account as ‘colourful’ (pg. 
254) or ‘patently unconvincing’ (pg. 253), one must imagine, not just that 
there is a reality ‘out there’ waiting for representation, but also that the facts 
of that reality, once spoken, can be somehow recognised as such.  Nowhere 
is this assumption more evident than in Gough’s (2004) analysis of men’s 
homophobia, in which he makes a series of judgements about the 
appropriateness or adequacy of his own participants’ talk.  For example, 
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Gough sees an element of hysteria in the way that Trev talks about 
homosexuality (see Extract One above).  The suggestion is that Trev’s 
expression of disgust carries too much potency or passion to be accounted 
for at an entirely local level.  Its impetus must have come from elsewhere 
(i.e. Trevor’s psyche).  Likewise, the work of psychic forces is read into 
‘Martin’s’ account (on pg. 254) of the demeanour and appearance of 
homosexuals, on the basis that it simply doesn’t square with reality.  
However, one of the cornerstones of discourse analytical work is the 
assumption that, as an analyst, one cannot (or, at least, should not presume 
to) know a priori what counts as an appropriate or warranted utterance.  The 
analyst has no ‘God’s eye view’ of the world and its workings.  Instead, 
‘reality’ or ‘the truth’ is treated as a participants’ concern.  Once again, it is 
seen as both the subject and the outcome of discourse, rather than its 
backdrop. 
 
As a consequence of these differences, what we get in most attempts to 
combine discourse theory and psychoanalysis together is, not so much a 
synthesis, as the running of the two theories side-by-side.  In the work of 
Gough (2004), for example, we can see this in the way that his analyses keep 
switching between a representational and a functional or performative view 
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of language.  Such an oscillation is inevitable, it seems to me, insofar as the 
two approaches rest on incompatible (meta)theoretical foundations.  Indeed, 
it is worth recalling that discourse theory has a line on psychoanalysis; it 
sees it as a discourse (Moscovici, 1961/76).  Parker (1997) is no doubt right 
in identifying psychoanalysis as key resource for the construction of 
contemporary selves.  However, this is not the same as claiming that things 
like ‘repression’, ‘sublimation’ and other ‘ego-defences’ are actual mental 
events.  In order to do that, one either has to turn one’s back on discourse 
theory altogether or, at least, turn a blind eye to its legacy.  
 
Keeping the Faith 
 
In suggesting that discourse theory and psychoanalysis are theoretically 
incommensurate, I am clearly arguing that a choice needs to be made – and 
unsurprisingly, perhaps, my decision would be to stick within the terms of 
discourse theory.  In part this decision is prompted by the fact that I remain 
convinced by post-structuralist arguments about the nature of language 
(which thereby precludes any easy alignment with psychoanalysis), but it 
also arises from the belief that a discursive approach to the study of men and 
masculinity can answer its critics without having to look outside of itself. 
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 Probably one of the easiest of rebuttals to make is against the claim that, on 
a purely empirical basis, some other level of explanation is necessarily 
required to make full sense of particular stretches of data.  For example, in 
Extract One above, when Trev comes out with his ‘oh no (.) uugghh I just 
couldn’t’ and later with ‘it’s just disgustin (.) I can’t stand it’, as we have 
seen, Gough interprets these remarks as unwarranted by the surrounding 
discursive context.  They are treated as somehow excessive or ‘over the top’.  
However, one could argue that, from a DP perspective, Trev is exploiting 
precisely this kind of interpretation to powerful rhetorical effect.  The 
construction of oneself as viscerally disturbed by the mere thought of kissing 
another man can be seen as exquisitely designed in terms of how it harnesses 
an essentialist discourse of the self.  The fact that Trev portrays himself as 
being constitutionally predisposed to finding such acts disgusting, shouldn’t 
be taken at face value.  Instead, it should be seen as a formulation that makes 
a highly robust claim to a heterosexual identity.  Indeed, when looked at in 
this way, one could very well argue that the pervasiveness of homophobia in 
men and boys’ discourse reflects, not its deep psychic origins at all, but its 
premier status as a routine (ethno)method for constructing oneself as straight 
(c.f. Nayak and Kehily, 1996). 
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 As one might expect, the charge that discursive approaches to studying men 
and masculinity lack an account or theory of the ‘interior’ space of the 
human mind is a little more difficult to counter.  However, what seems quite 
certain is that discursive psychologists would want to resist the idea that 
there is some kind of firm dividing line between the social and the psychic.  
For them, there is no real difference between what lies within and what lies 
without.  Indeed, as suggested by the Marxist psychologist, Lev Vygotsky 
(1978), we can conceive of thought as talk or conversation turned inwards 
(see Wertsch, 1985, 1991).  What this means, of course, is that to study the 
realm of public discourse is to study the workings of the mind – it is not a 
poor substitute for the real thing.  This idea receives further support from the 
work of Michael Billig (1987; Billig et al, 1988), who has shown that, as a 
form of inner speech, thought preserves the dialogic character of social 
discourse.  What this seems to imply is that the complex, dynamic and 
inconsistent nature of subjectivity is a form of polyvocality or heteroglossia 
(see Bakhtin, 1981), rather than the product of an unconscious.  In other 
words, the mind can be seen as the meeting place of many different voices – 
all of social origins.  Moreover, as Billig (1987) points out, these voices are 
related to one another rhetorically.  To speak/ think in one voice is always, 
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in some sense, to speak against or instead of another.  What this, in turn, 
suggests is that a process such as repression can be understood in discursive, 
as opposed to psycho-dynamic terms (see Billig, 1997; 1998; 1999).  It 
becomes simply that which remains unspoken or implicit rather than that 
which is banished from consciousness (c.f. Derrida, 1973). 
 
A final point here is that, according to Billig et al (1988), it is the 
contradictory, or dilemmatic, character of culture that provides, both the 
impetus and resources, for all kinds of social/ subjective activity.  In other 
words, we do not need another realm (such as the unconscious) in order to 
account for why men say and act the way that they do – there is sufficient 
‘creative tension’ within culture itself. 
It is not haphazard that common sense contains its contrary themes 
[...] that it possesses its dilemmatic character.  The very existence of 
these opposing images, words, evaluations, maxims and so on is 
crucial, in that they permit the possibility not just of social dilemmas 
but of social thinking itself. 
(Billig et al, 1988, pg. 17) 
 
What this still leaves, of course, is the other major criticism of discourse 
approaches to studying men and masculinity mentioned at the start, which 
relates to the ‘stickiness’ of identity or the sense of ‘bounded’ subjectivity.  
As Freeman (1993) noted, in everyday life it does feel as though there is at 
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least something about us that resists reconstruction; something that we carry 
with us from one social or discursive context to the next.  As we have seen, 
for the psychoanalytically inclined, this ‘something’ is the characteristic 
furniture of the human psyche; that distinctive pattern or interplay of 
anxieties and ego-defences that compel us to be who we are.  For the 
discursive psychologist, however, this obviously will not do. 
 
Nevertheless, a thorough-going discursive explanation of the above must 
begin, I would argue, with the common sense notion that we are someone in 
particular.  For what this demonstrates is that, in the West at least, there is a 
normative expectation that people will have their own mind and biography.  
We expect ourselves and others to be (reasonably) consistent in one’s 
thoughts and actions – and, indeed, any dramatic deviation from those 
patterns is something for which a person is very likely to be held 
accountable.  What this implies, of course, is that there doesn’t have to be 
some kind of ‘inner’ or psychodynamic structure that anchors men to 
particular ways of being in the world.  Rather, it means that, in our culture, 
producing oneself as consistent is a central discourse practice.  As Foucault 
(1972) would say, the ideology of the Cartesian subject works to construct 
the object of which it speaks (see Edley, 2002). 
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 In conclusion, we should see that whilst DP can and does highlight the 
flexible deployment of language resources in the local production of 
masculinities, it can also account for patterns of consistency.  It can account 
for the existence of recognizably individual selves as socially constructed 
realities.  Men, I would argue, are highly accomplished (as) individuals.  We 






1. Although there is an obvious paradox here – for whilst DP has been 
criticised for exaggerating the extent of human agency, other post-
structuralist theorists have been ‘hauled over the coals’ for implying 
exactly the opposite.  For example, Laclau & Mouffe (1985) have 
been criticised for suggesting that discourse is the principal or primary 
agent and that ‘we’ simply follow in its wake. 
 
2. Whilst Tyson was both world famous and a multi-millionaire, his 
aggressive behaviour outside of the ring led to the failure of his 
marriage and then, later on, a prison sentence having been charged 
and found guilty of rape. 
 
3. Interestingly, in a 2002 edition of the New Statesman, the British gay 
activist, Peter Tatchell, speculates as to whether or not Tyson himself 
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